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STUDENT NOTES
AUTOMOBILES:

COMPULSORY

AUTOMOBILE

INSURANCE.

A statute of Connecticut provides that if any person by operation
of an automobile has injured or killed another, or has damaged property to the extent of $100, the registration of his car is withdrawn unless he or the owner proves financial responsibility to satisfy any
claim up to $10,000 for injuries to a person, and up to $1,000 for
damage to property. Such proof may be made either by an insurance policy, surety bond, or deposit of cash or security with the state
treasurer. In addition, no registration for any car may be issued to
the person who did the injury or to the owner, nor may either of them
obtain a driver's license until such proof is made. Thus after one
accident the security must be supplied, irrespective of negligence and
consequent legal liability, by both the driver and the owner if they
are different persons. The bond is canceled or the security is returned three years after the deposit, if during that time the depositor
has not violated any provisions of the motor vehicle laws, and if no
right of action or judgment arising out of the operation of his car is
outstanding against him.
Connecticut is not alone among the states in its adoption of this
form of insurance. At least forty states have it, in one form or another, and fourteen impose a duty on the owners and drivers of private
4
2
3
cars. Of these, six, namely: New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
5
North Dakota, California,O and Iowa," passed their statutes in 1929.
The reason for such legislation is apparent. The American Road
Builders' Association estimates that more than 30,000 persons were
killed and 868,000 injured in the world through motor accidents in
1926. Of the fatalities 80% were in the United States. A perusal of
the World's Almanac reveals that there were 14,411 auto fatalities in
the United States in 1923, while in 1930 the number had risen to
30,042, an increase of over 100% in seven years. Of the combined
number of injuries and fatalities it is estimated that one-fourth of
those entitled by law to collect fail because of the financial irresponsibility of the defendant. 8
'Laws Conn. 1925, c. 183.
2
N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 695, § 94(c).
'N. J. Laws 1929, c. 116, § 2.
'R. I. Laws 1929, c. 1429, § 7.
Laws of N. D. 1929, c. 163, § 1.
64 Cal. Gen Laws 1929, § 379.
'Iowa Statute 1929, c. 118.
8 See Compulsory Automobile Insurance, by Harry J. Loman, in
the annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
March, 1927.
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Although it is difficult to determine the exact amount of success
with which compulsory automobile compensation has met in the
states which have adopted it, it is safe to assume that it has remedied
to some degree this deplorable situation.
From the viewpoint of opponents of the plan there are two principal objections to it: (1) it is unconstitutional; (2) it is unfair and
discriminative.
As to the constitutionality of such legislation three questions may
be asked: (1) Is it within the police power of the legislature? (2) Are
the provisions of the particular act consistent with due process of law?
and (3) does the act infringe upon the right to equal protection of
the law?
The legislature has power to license the use of automobiles and
some courts have held that this power is a valid source of the right
to make such laws? Other courts have sustained the requirement of
security upon the ground that the operation of motor vehicles is a
privilege which can be prohibited and that what may be prohibited
may be granted upon any condition."
Other opinions have been to
the effect that such a requirement could be predicated upon the state's
right to control highways," or upon the more general power to enact
laws for the public safety and control over inherently dangerous instrumentalities." Concerning due process of law there is little to be said
against such legislation. The legislature has always had the power to
subject the use of automobiles to the requirement of a license. Therefore, there is no natural right involved which would be impaired by
such legislation; the net result being that it merely imposes another
requirement upon the obtaining of a license which was not necessary
before.
The constitutional objection is further answered by the decision
in Packard v. Banton where the court said that the use of public streets
"for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary, and generally, at
least, may be prohibited or conditioned as the legislature thinks
3
proper.",
From what has been said it seems clear that somewhere within
the broad scope of the police power, which embraces the right to make
reasonable enactments for public health, morals and welfare, will be
found the power to impose requirements of the kind herein proposed.
Is such legislation unfair and discriminative? This writer cannot
bring himself to such a conclusion. Opponents of the plan point out
the constitutional right to sue for injuries caused by the wrongful
conduct of another and maintain that such rights will bar exclusive
9 In re Cardinal, 170 Cal. 419, 150 Pac. 348 (1915) (in which is
cited Sec. 40, Freund, Police Power, to the effect that security may be
required wherever the power to license exists).
10New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 139 La. 113, 71 So. 248 (1915).
2 In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 681
(1925).
"In re Opinion of the Justices, 81 N. H. 5t6, 129 At. 117 (1925).
23264 U. S. 140 (1924).
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compensation with optional compensation as the only alternative.
Optional compensation, in turn, discriminates outrageously against
motorists as a class, since they pay compensation when not at fault,
and damages when they are at fault, with no offsetting benefits. The
argument is sound but the premise is wrong. A distinction is to be
noted between the kind of statute this contention is based on, and
the kind advocated by the majority of those who favor the plan. In
the former the taking out of insurance by every motorist is mandatory; while in the latter it is conditioned upon violation of some
motor car law, or upon being involved in an accident as provided by
the particular statute. No person is compelled to furnish security of
any kind until he has violated some provision of the statute. The
statute does not compel the motorist class as a whole to furnish security, but only those individuals who are violators of motor car laws
and are reckless in their driving. It is submitted that this is in no
way unjust or discriminatory.
Such a statute would act as a strong preventive of future accidents. The average wage earning owner who is unable to afford insurance
would guard against careless or reckless driving, when he knows that
once he has been in an accident or has violated some motor car law
(as provided by the particular statute) he will be compelled to furnish
security or else be barred from the roads. Certainly even a slight reduction in the number of accidents causing loss of life and limb justifies the increased burden placed upon the type of motorist the statute
would require to furnish security.
In summary there are two reasons for having such an act: (1)
protection of accident victims, (2) prevention of future accidents. Do
these two interests outweigh the slight increase in the burden placed
upon the motorist? The answer to this question must be in the affirmative. In conclusion it is proposed that Kentucky adopt a statute
similar to that of Connecticut. There is no doubt as to the great need
when it is recalled that in Kentucky in 1923 there were only 166 auto
fatalities while in 1930 the number jumped to 514,-an increase of
over 200% in seven years. Certainly the present system of regulating
the matter in this State is antique in its methods and wholly inadequate to cope with the problem.
EMERSON SALISBURY.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS: ADULTERY AS A GROUND FOR
DIVORCE.
A husband sued for divorce on the grounds of adultery. It appeared that the wife had been guilty of adultery, but such had been
condoned by the husband by subsequent cohabitation. Thereafter she
again committed adultery. The court held that the second offense
revived the original cause of action, and that the husband was entitled to a divorce.1
1

5World's Almanac (1935 ed.) p. 858.
'Wagner v. Wagner, 130 Md. 346, 100 AtI. 364 (1917).

